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CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION FROM
A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
EDGAR S. CAHN*
N AN EXCELLENT PIECE INCLUDED IN THIS SYMPOSIUM, Professors Jack
Sammons and Russell Cort characterize much of the controversy in
legal education as a debate over whether to teach "law" or "lawyering."'
They assert that once the threshold decision is made, everything else
follows.2 This article will discuss what follows.
A prestigous task force, established by the American Bar Association
to consider the role of law schools in improving lawyer competence,3
addressed the various aspects of legal education-admissions, cur-
riculum, faculty appointment-and framed recommendations concerning
key relevant constituencies: the law schools, the bar, admissions
authorities, lawyers generally and governmental agencies.' One fact
clearly emerges from that examination: all facets of an educational
system are affected when one attempts to alter the objectives of that
system. If one regards the graduate of a law school as a primary product
of the educational process, then a decision to change the characteristics
of that product necessarily involves three variables: the nature of the
raw material, the design of the educational process and the quality con-
trol systems to which both are subject. If lawyering competency simply
meant the addition of a course or two, the consequences for the system
might be minimal. But even an attempt simply to improve a law
student's writing skills has been known to cause major upheavals in cur-
riculum and faculty workload.
This article seeks to address some of the consequences of choosing to
make the imparting of lawyering competency a primary objective of
legal education and utilizing a clinical methodology to accomplish that
objective. My basic argument is that more is entailed than simply the
addition of a clinic. In effect, one is talking about "system design."
Regardless of the scale of that system, the emergence of competency
criteria has direct applicability to the design and grading of final exa-
minations in conventional classroom courses. The larger the scale of a
clinic within a school's curriculum, the more significant the conse-
quences for the dominant pattern of legal education, the prevailing
*Former Dean, Antioch School of Law.
' Cort and Sammons, The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and
Model of Lawyering Competencies, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397 (1980).
2 Id. at 400.
ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY, THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOL
(1979).
' Id. at 3-7.
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deployment of resources by law schools and the nature of quality con-
trol standards that the public interest requires in licensing the indivi-
dual and the institution.
A systems approach to any set of rules or norms begins from the
premise that one does not know the true meaning of a rule until one has
examined the institutional environment within which it lives: the
resources assigned, the monitoring, feed-back and enforcement mechan-
isms available, the personnel policies, the organizational structure and
budgetary process which bind the entire institution. This is simply
realism, expanded to a systems basis and applied to legal education.
Any rule, norm or policy can be frustrated by the mode of implementa-
tion, the importance or lack of importance assigned to it and the effec-
tiveness of the mechanisms and procedures for securing implementa-
tion. In legal education, as in law, an attempt to legislate norms calls for
a systems approach that focuses not only on the delineation of the
norms but also on the creation of a coherent and correlated planning,
management and administrative design, having the capacity to apply
those norms so as to realize their intent.
One begins, of course, with a definition of the norms themselves-but
that is only the beginning.
I. DEFINING COMPETENCY OBJECTIVES
5
The process of defining competency objectives for lawyering is com-
plex. There seem to be two basic approaches that can be taken: a task
approach and a generic competency approach.
The task approach begins with an attempt to enumerate those tasks
or activities which form the core of lawyering activity; once those are
selected, then the objectives of that activity need to be defined and
criteria developed for determining the extent to which a law student (or
lawyer) has succeeded in realizing those objectives.' The initial
enumeration of lawyering tasks consisted of the following:
5 This part, indeed the entire article, draws upon ten years of wrestling with
the problems of defining educational objectives in competency terms and trying
to create an institutional environment within which those objectives could be
achieved. It does not purport to be an objective description of that process.
Though these ten years were spent at Antioch School of Law in Washington D.C.,
neither does this article purport to be a description of Antioch itself. Rather, it is
a personal set of observations drawn from the learning process I underwent.
6 This is the point at which the quest for competency standards began at
Antioch. The California bar, in launching the first massive test of lawyering com-
petency as an experimental portion of the July 1980 bar examination, used the
same approach. The California bar experiment drew directly upon material
developed at Antioch and appears to have utilized, in revised forms, the rating
sheets developed at Antioch in its early experimentation with a "task" approach
conducting Professional Boards that involved a series of carefully pre-scripted
simulation exercises. Letter from Kenneth McCloskey, Director of Examinations
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Initial Interviewing (including preparation of an Intake
Memorandum)
Fact Investigation and Verification (including preparation for a
discovery deposition)
Legal Research and Library Skills
Legal Analysis
Client Counselling
Negotiating
Drafting a legal memorandum
Law Advocacy-Direct and Cross Examination
Strategy and Tactics
Formal Writing Skills
File Maintenance
Client Management
Professional Responsibility
An anomalous rating category call "Initiative/Motivation" 7
A task approach to defining lawyering competency objectives has the
advantage of providing an instructor with a concrete starting point. In
any particular case, it is possible to specifically enumerate the
skills- factual, legal, analytic and interpersonal-that are part of a com-
petent performance. The unstated premise is that, if each discrete task
can be performed competently in the context of one case, it can prob-
ably be performed competently in other kinds of cases, regardless of the
particular area of substantive law involved!
A task centered definition of lawyering competency thus provides a
starting point and, as a practical matter, may be the most useful
approach when it comes to formalized simulation testing. Thus, for
instance, the criteria by which a "competent" interview were judged
derive from the following enumeration of objectives:
to Committee of Bar Examiners of the State of California (July 9, 1979) (Califor-
nia Committee of Bar Examiners' Study on the relationship between alternative
measures of lawyering competencies).
' For the recent task listing see Cort and Sammons, supra note 1, Appendix
A, B and C. This enumeration was the end-product of a faculty retreat, consulta-
tion with private practitioners and the follow-up work of a special Task Force at
Antioch.
The California bar examination focused on similar tasks. The "Attorney for
the Plaintiff" was to conduct a client interview, develop a written discovery plan
and interrogatories, prepare a client for direct examination, write a trial brief,
and engage in a closing argument. The "Attorney for Defendant" was to write an
initial memorandum for the file, interview and counsel a client, draft a counter
proposal and letter to client, giving the opening statement, replying to opposing
party's written points and authority memorandum and conduct a cross examin-
ation. See note 35 infra.
' Lawyer observers can usually agree on whether a particular performance
was competent, particularly if provided with a check list of tasks covering a fairly
even mix of written and oral exercises.
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1. Determine client objectives (legal and non-legal) and
priorities among those objectives.
2. Elicit relevant facts-those which support and those which
negate a possible cause of action-together with leads to
additional facts and sources of verification.
3. Establish realistic expectations and an understanding of
next steps, respective responsibilities of client and attorney
and scope (and terms) of the representation to be under-
taken.
4. Establish a relationship of confidence necessary for minimal
client cooperation and trust.'
A task-centered definition of competency works well in totally con-
trolled situations such as a simulation. It will not suffice for a clinic
where time constraints, context, body of law and particular dynamics
vary radically for different cases. Thus, for instance, assessing the "com-
petence" of a five minute interview in a cell block involves a different
application of the same criteria when applied to an extended two hour
interview in a landlord tenant case. Moreover, clinical supervisors can-
not be present to observe every client interview; adequate fact gather-
ing may involve going back to the client repeatedly as new facets of a
case merge; and students tend to "solve" clients' problems using their
strongest skills and avoiding reliance on their weakest. Thus students
with strong oral negotiating skills may do a superb job in handling
client cases but provide the clinical supervisor with no opportunity to
determine the student's competence in legal analysis, professional
responsibility or written communication."
Because each task can be performed in innumberable contexts, sub-
ject to a near infinite combination of variables and because it is vitally
important for legal educators to have some common language in compar-
ing clinical and classroom performance, Antioch moved away from the
task focused approach and undertook to develop a list of generic com-
petencies which would apply to all tasks." This required extensive
discussion because it involved abstracting from particular tasks to for-
mulate generalized modes of lawyering activity, then testing the defini-
tion and completeness of each of those "generic competencies" against
personal experience in performing specific lawyering tasks to determine
' Endless variations can be and have been formulated respecting this particu-
lar list of objectives. But under each category it is possible to develop a specific
check list and rating form for each objective.
'0 One would expect that student competency as a lawyer in the clinic should
bear some relation to performance in the law school generally. Classroom pro-
fessors are convinced that they alone are in a position to assess a student's com-
petence in legal analysis, particularly "issue spotting." They tend to downgrade
clinical competence as consisting of only "soft" non-analytic interpersonal skills.
" See Cort and Sammons, supra note 1.
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whether there were particular tasks or facets of tasks that were not ful-
ly incorporated in one or another of the generic competencies. Thus, for
instance, there is clearly an element of legal analysis involved in client
interviewing though most classroom teachers are not aware of this. To
elicit "relevant facts" one must have a criterion for relevance; rules of
law operate in an interview as a test of relevance and each question
implicitly or explicitly will be rooted in a rule of law (substantive or
evidentiary) that operates as a hypothesis against which the answer is
tested. If the question does not generate information that bears upon
any element of any conceivable cause of action or defense, then that
answer becomes critical to any tentative conclusion the interviewer
reaches concerning the validity of a claim or defense. In short, an intake
interview that produces an intake memorandum can test for oral com-
munication skills, written communication skills, legal analysis, problem
solving and sometimes for professional responsibility.
The result of this discussion at Antioch was a list of competencies and
subcompetencies, seemingly comprehensive enough to cover all lawyer-
ing activity.'2 The price paid for achieving this level of generalization
was that the concepts and the definitions may have become so general
and abstract that clinical supervisors might not agree as to which com-
petencies or subcompetencies were involved in a particular task. Even
when one reached agreement on that, rating the particular performance
on the particular task meant in practice that one had to assess the task
on its own terms first. Next, one had to move from there to judge what
competencies were involved and whether the task had generated suffi-
cient evidence to warrant a judgment regarding the broader generic
competency. Thus, a combination of the approaches is needed-one
which creates a matrix that adquately represents the ways in which
lawyering tasks and generic lawyering competencies intersect.
Once the tasks and competencies are defined, there still remains a ma-
jor task-a rating system for judging the level of proficiency. This can
involve a variation on the unceasing debate between pass-fail, numerical
systems and A-F grading scales. Functionally, however, we found these
numerical systems involved making judgments about whether and
under what circumstances we would let a student loose on an actual
case to perform the given task or to utilize the specific competency. We
ended up with a six tier system that stood for the following judgments:
1. Serious deficiency: could not be trusted with client or
trusted to perform task,
2. Deficiency: required continuous supervision,
3. Marginal: did some work with minimal supervision but could
cause problems if not carefully supervised,
4. Minimal competency: usually performed tasks satisfactorily
with some supervision,
12 See Appendix A.
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5. Competency: performed task(s) satisfactorily with virtually
no supervision except for final review,
6. Superior competency: performed tasks in outstanding man-
ner with virtually no supervision except for final review and
could supervise others."3
This development summarizes merely what is involved in full articula-
tion of competency based standards when one attempts to define the
objectives of legal education in output or behavioral terms. Like all
other statements of standards or norms, these are not self-applying. To
produce a "product" capable of meeting these standards requires look-
ing at all elements of the production system-starting with the admis-
sions process which determines the minimal specifications for the "raw
material" which can be expected to meet or surpass these competency
objectives after undergoing a prescribed course of study.
From a "systems design" perspective, the admissions process sets the
minimal specifications for the "raw material" to be processed and
tested, and certifies by some form of quality control. On an aggregate
basis, this refers to questions about the mix of the incoming class: race,
sex, economic class, age, handicap. On the individual level, it gives rise
to highly controversial issues involving "character qualifications" for
admissions to law schools. These take their starkest form when applied
to persons with a misdemeanor or felony conviction (which may stem
from a civil rights or peace demonstration, a marijuana arrest or a
juvenile offense)." The question of who should be given the opportunity
to become a lawyer takes on a more subtle normative aspect when one
considers the application of a brilliant but immature or unstable indivi-
dual. Clinical education necessarily raises questions about emotional
maturity, self-knowledge and personal discipline if a school proposes to
"unleash" its students on an unsuspecting client who has no choice but
to place trust in the judgment as well as the technical expertise of the
student as a professional.
Just as admissions seeks to select those students who demonstrate
the highest potential to achieve excellence in legal analysis, is should
also seek those with the highest potential in the other but equally vital
dimensions of lawyering competency-the ability to communicate orally
as well as in writing, the ability to solve problems, weight competing op-
tions and devise and test alternative solutions in an uncertain world.
Those students should also have the ability to cope with the competing
demands of multiple clients (as well as the competing demands of clinic
and classroom, court deadlines and exam periods).
Additionally, students should be selected who show the highest poten-
tial to make a contribution to those "minimal" normative aspirations of
-- See also Cort and Sammons, supra note 1, at 424, 447.
" See generally ABA, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE 17 (1979) (paragraph 504).
[Vol. 29:451
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss3/14
SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
the profession, i.e., to make equal justice under law a reality and to
improve the capacity of the legal system to respond to the legitimate
grievances of persons without alternative sources of redress. And parti-
cularly because the client population is often comprised of those groups
that have been the historic victims of discrimination, each school should
be required to ask whether it does have a duty to redress, through its
admissions process, the cumulative effect of historic patterns of exclu-
sion of minorities and women from the legal profession. 5
When one broadens the learning objectives, one necessarily alters the
entry requirements. Aptitude to become a minimally competent "stu-
dent lawyer" or "paralegal" differs from the aptitude required to
become a minimally competent law student or "exam taker." Shifting
the focus to lawyering competency means that aptitude embraces more
than the traditional legal analysis.
Moreover, when aptitude is assessed, it is done in the terms of the
available learning process. Capacity to learn entails two elements: (1)
what; and (2) how. When alternative learning systems are created, as
with the clinical method, predictive tests which measure aptitude for
learning by one methodology (the appellate case methods) do not neces-
sarily indicate potential to learn by other methodologies. Theoretically,
clinical education ought to open admissions to people with different
learning styles. There is no longer a reason for excluding persons who
might have difficulty coping with legal analysis taught exclusively in
the conventional fashion if they can demonstrate the potential to
achieve identical proficiency at the same competence by practical appli-
cation in a clinical setting. 6
One study conducted at Anitoch 7 examined the relationship between
" See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18 This portion of the discussion draws directly on the Amicus Brief of the
Antioch School of Law which was written by myself, Jean Camper Cahn and
Robert S. Catz and submitted to the United States Supreme Court in 1976 in the
case of The Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
The discussion also draws on experimentation with Professional Boards and with
new approaches to academic standards developed at Antioch.
" J. George, The Domino Theory of Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis
of Entry Barriers to the Legal Profession (1976) (unpublished thesis in Antioch
School of Law Library). The Antioch study is strikingly mirrored by one from the
University of California at San Diego School of Medicine where two groups of
students were compared, those admitted on the basis of MCAT scores and those
from disadvantaged backgrounds admitted by a special "variance procedure."
The difference in performance of the two groups appears to have decreased
rapidly with the onset of internships or clinical rotations. Simon and Covell, Per-
formance of Medical Students Admitted Via Regular and Admission-Variance
Routes, 50 J. MED. EDUC. 237 (1975). A 1975 study at Temple University Medical
School raises similar questions about the relationship of testing methods to
determinations about competence. Baum and Ireland, Minority Student Perfor-
mance on Pathology Examination, 67 J. NAT'L MED. Assoc. 334 (1975). The Study
evaluates the performances of two second year classes (1972-73 and 1973-74) on
19801
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actual performance in both classroom and clinic during the first and
second years of law school with prelaw variables (e.g., Writing Ability
section of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), and Grade Point
Average (GPA)) which are supposed to predict student performance.
The results indicate no correlation between LSAT scores and grades at
the end of the second year. 8 The study did find that in the first year a
correlation existed between two predictors of performance, GPA and
the Writing Ability score, and trends in both classroom and clinic. This
correlation disappeared by the end of the second year. 9
It appears that exposure to clinical pedagogy in the first and second
years eliminated the predictive value of the LSAT. The study also found
that there was chance (random) correlation between the LSAT, GPA,
second year grades and performance on an old multistate examination
scored by the National Conference of Bar Examiners." These results dif-
fer sharply from validation studies performed in traditional law schools
where the LSAT did show significant correlation with performance in
the second and third year and with subsequent performance on the
multistate examination."
The experience at Antioch, combined with these studies, suggests
that test scores are of dubious predictive value if 1) they are only
predictive of performance as a student, not as a professional following
graduation; 2) they are only predictive of performance as a student
two different kinds of pathology examinations, an objective multiple choice test
and a practical/clinical test covering the same content. Analyzing the differential
performance of minority class members on these types of examinations, the
researchers reported that minority students performed below the median on the
objective tests, but performed well above the median on practical examinations
designed and graded by the same faculty. The authors advanced these two inter-
pretations of the data: "1. It would appear that the format of the standardized
objective examinations favors white students .... 2. The better than average
performance of black and other ethnic minority students on the practical examin-
ations suggests that their proficiency for achievement in an applied situation is
greater than that of their white contemporaries .. " Id. at 325.
These conclusions in the medical field about the import of different testing
methodologies are corroborated by a survey of the literature on the relationship
between undergraduate performance, performance in medical school and subse-
quent performance as a physician. "[A]vailable research findings have
demonstrated that little or no correlation exists between academic and profes-
sional performance." Wingard and Williamson, Grades as Predicates of Physi-
cians' Career Performance: An Evaluative Literature Review, 48 J. MED. EDUC.
311, 313 (1973). Based on this conclusion, the authors suggest there is a need to
reevaluate the use of grades in making career decisions and urged the greater
study of "performance" in the future. Id. at 313-14.
j. George, supra note 17.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 22.
21 These studies were reviewed in the EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, INTER-
PRETIVE BOOKLET LSAT/LSDAS (1974).
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operating in a traditional classroom setting, not student performance in
a clinical, applied or practice setting requiring demonstration of iden-
tical competencies; and 3) they are at best only predictive of some, but
not all of the crucial competencies required.
The LSAT and GPA have enjoyed an unjustified centrality in admis-
sions for several reasons. First, they appeared to be the best predictors
of superior student performance in the first year; they did not purport
to predict merely satisfactory performance. Yet the research on the
LSAT and GPA confirms that there is approximately a fifty percent
(50%) chance that those who receive mediocre LSAT scores will do
superior work in the first year in the most traditional curriculum.22
Unfortunately, neither the LSAT or GPA provide an indication of which
fifty percent (50%) will do well and which will do only marginal work.
Second, it was assumed that the first year curriculum could not be
varied to permit persons with different learning styles to acquire profi-
ciency in legal analysis. Experiments with programmed learning mater-
ials, with simulation and with earlier initiation of clinical programs, sug-
gest that the lockstep sequencing of the first year need not be inviol-
able. 3 Competence in legal analysis and written communications is
indeed essential but it is not clear what level of proficiency must be
gained prior to educationally profitable involvement in clinical pro-
grams.
Thirdly, the LSAT and GPA have enjoyed prominence as admissions
criteria because it was assumed that nothing other than machine scor-
able objective tests, in combination with Grade Point Adverage, would
enable admissions officers to cope with the unprecedented increase in
law school applications that inundated law schools in the fifties and six-
ties. 4 The argument might well be made that priorities were wrong,
that the initial selection of students was the area where law schools
should have invested more resources. One might take the position that
if the "right" student is admitted, that student will be able to learn in
spite of deficiencies such as an uneven faculty, student ratios and poor
facilities. Conversely, if admissions makes poor choices, the best
faculties, ratios and facilities will have only a marginal impact. In short,
although economics in law school admissions served administrative con-
venience, it may have deprived the profession and our society of in-
dividuals who could have made outstanding contributions. Law school
economics of the future are likely to make it imperative that factors
other than the LSAT and GPA be considered, for as the applicant pool
levels off, and even decreases in coming years, the schools, driven by
22 Id.
23 See Munger, Clinical Legal Education: The Case Against Separatism, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 715 (1980).
24 R. STRICKLAND, HOW TO GET INTO LAW SCHOOL 18-25 (1974).
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the importance of tuition incomes, will have to scrutinize those who app-
ly far less mechanically and with far greater individual attention.
There are numerous situations where persons who do "merely" satis-
factory work in a traditional first year curriculum in fact prove to be
highly superior lawyers over the long run. Given the availability of
clinical programs, students may be able to demonstrate their potential
excellence across the broad range of lawyering competencies while still
in law school. If so, the basis for placing such undue weight on the LSAT
and GPA is sharply undermined.
Once the school delineates the production of lawyers, rather than test
takers, a law school responsibility, it may proceed on either of two
assumptions. First, the first year curriculum will not change; minimal
competency in legal analysis gained through the traditional method will
remain a prerequisite to entry to the clinic and ultimately into the pro-
fession. Even if a school was to proceed on this assumption, it should not
want to exclude students who may only do satisfactory work in the first
year but promise to develop into highly competent lawyers with the
potential to make significant contributions to the profession and society.
Second, first year curriculum will change so that students with different
learning styles can acquire the same competencies via different pedago-
gic methods. Under these circumstances, it becomes even more impor-
tant to develop an admissions process which does not equate potential
competence with present level of test taking facility. Under either
assumption, it becomes important to pay attention to a new range of fac-
tors and new types of evidence in admissions.
My observations of the system developed at Antioch lead me to con-
clude that we made only two bottom line judgments. We asked what
potential did the applicant manifest 1) to achieve competence as a
lawyer within the time frame and learning opportunities available at
Antioch; and 2) to make a significant contribution to equal justice under
law and to improving the capacity of the legal system to respond to the
grievances of the disenfranchised. In retrospect, trying to analyze how
one might arrive at answers to those questions, I would propose the
following sequence of analysis with respect both to competence and con-
tribution.
First, examine the types of evidence deemed conventionally probative
of legal analysis and written communication competencies. These
include the LSAT (taking into account whether the applicant had taken
a prep course or taken it several times), the GPA (taking into account
whether the major was "hard" or "soft" and whether the school was
known for high standards or inflated grades), any graduate degree, and
any formal honors or awards. Taking these together gives rise to an ini-
tial predictive rating: excellent, possible excellence, solid but not
distinguished, undistinguished, marginal, or high risk with major signifi-
cant deficiences. This initial rating is then subject to a two stage adjust-
ment through (a) mitigating factors that would affect the initial assess-
[Vol. 29:451
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ment based on conventional indications of potential competence, and (b)
non-traditional evidence creating an independent affirmative basis for
concluding that the candidate possessed higher potential than tradi-
tional evidence would indicate.
Under mitigating factors, it would be relevant to ask the following
questions. Was the person a bona fide poor test taker who had demon-
strated previously that despite poor performance at standardized tests,
he or she was capable of high academic achievement? Was English a
second language? Was the applicant the first generation descendant of
an immigrant family? Were there educational deficiencies that might be
relevant to the acquisition of test taking skills? Did the applicant
undergo a personal crisis or illness that might have affected perfor-
mance on the day of the examination. With respect to collegiate Grade
Point Average, it is appropriate to inquire whether the applicant was a
"late bloomer," or had to shoulder such personal family or financial
problems that past academic performance would not be indicative of
potential competence. These types of evidence, taken as a kind of rebut-
tal to the initial assessment, would then be assigned a weight: convinc-
ing, plausible, possibly relevant or largely irrelevant or unconvincing.
Next, admissions should examine other evidence that has a direct
bearing either on particular skills or on the kind of motivational drive
and emotional make-up that somehow allows an individual to prevail
despite the odds. This includes a consideration of work experience, work
products submitted, application form answers, unusual recommenda-
tions, family background, past contribution or achievement in work,
extra-curricular or community affairs, specialized skills or knowledge of
potential utility, the range of life experience, and particularly relevant
paralegal or law related experience.
Finally, an assessment should be made in terms of motivational quali-
ties which appear to bear on learning and performance potential in both
clinical and classroom settings. These include physical staying power,
energy level, persistence, frustration tolerance, tolerance of ambiguity,
ability to cope with competing demands, degree of ambition or achieve-
ment orientation, and specific motivational factors related to becoming a
lawyer.
The same categories of evidence would then be scrutinized separately
in terms of potential to make a distinctive contribution to equal justice
or to improvement of the legal system.25 Here, the answers to questions
25 While the reader is referred to the above-mentioned amicus brief in
Bakke (see note 16 supra, for a discussion of the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to consider race, class, sex or national origin as relevant to a deter-
mination of potential competence or potential contribution), certain points should
not be omitted even if stated in rather conclusory terms. In Bakke, we argued
that race was important in evaluating an applicant's potential for competence in
at least three ways:
1. Where communication skills are being evaluated by tests, poor
1980]
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on an application form or in an interview can prove particularly signifi-
cant. I found one question on the Antioch application consistently
yielded significant data: "Describe a particular injustice to which you
were personally subjected or which you personally witnessed. What did
you do and in retrospect, what would you do now?"
It is possible to categorize the types of evidence, to articulate the
inferences which may be drawn, and to delineate the sequence of ques-
tions and inquiries that should be followed in order to consider all rele-
vant evidence bearing on potential competence and potential contribu-
tion. Even without a systematic and "validated" procedure, it might
well be asked whether anyone picks his or her lawyer by inquiring
about their LSAT score-and reflect on the significance of the answer
for law school admissions. Where admissions programs do not take
account of intuitively relevant types of evidence, it would seem appro-
priate for clinical programs to insist upon establishing their own admis-
sions criteria on grounds that concern for the well-being of the clients
and the learning experience of other students in the clinic is important
and should not impaired by admitting students who may have a dis-
tinctly adverse effect on service to clients or learning by fellow
students. Control over the "raw material" that is to be subjected to the
clinical "educational system" is critical to the design of that system.
III. SYSTEMS DESIGN: THE BASIC ELEMENTS
Admissions criteria simply determine who is subjected to the educa-
tion process. The design of the process is more complex in part because
test scores of minority applicants may understate the adequacy of pre-
sent skills in communicating with clients. . . . [and] distort judgments
about the applicant's potential to achieve proficiency in [communication
skills]....
2. Where the definition of professional competence incorporates
values, assumptions and perspectives held by the majority culture, poor
test performance may only reflect the extent of the divergence between
the minority culture on assumptions about, for instance, the fairness of
judges. ...
3. Where tests and grades only measure an applicant's readiness to
benefit from one pedagogic method and to perform on one range of test
instruments, they cannot be predictive of potential to achieve and
demonstrate competence via other pedagogic and testing methods.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Brief of the
Antioch School of Law Amicus Curiae at 4. For a more detailed discussion, see id.
at 14-30.
Regarding potential to contribute to equal justice and to improvement of the
legal system, we argued that, given a sample in which both white and non-white
candidates equally assert their commitment to contribute, a higher percentage of
non-whites in fact devote a considerable portion of their professional lives to
addressing denials of equal justice and seeking to improve the legal system even
though that contribution may well be involuntary in an unknown number of
instances. Id. at 6. For fuller discussion, see id. at 31-39.
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the model of teaching and learning requires that a teacher consciously
conceptualize his role.
My father used to define a lecture as "the method by which the notes
of the professor are transferred to the notebook of the student without
going through the minds of either." The Socratic method adds uncer-
tainty, guesswork and personal anxiety to the note taking process; it
does not necessary yield active thinking or comprehension. Many would
contend that most of the real learning takes place in student study
groups, in the frenetic intensity of legal writing and moot court
assignments, and in the great cramming orgy that precedes final exa-
minations. The teacher's role may simply be to inject an in terrorem ef-
fect that paces the reading a student does in anticipation of the time
when the student sits down to figure out for himself or herself what the
material is all about prior to an examination or a written assignment.
The clinical methodology makes explicit what educators have always
known: there is an unwritten curriculum that is at least as important as
what is taking place in the classroom, which includes the information,
priorities, norms, and role models being provided by the total institu-
tional environment. The conventional law teacher is garbed with an
aura of infallibility and omniscience; the clinical teacher is in a far less
protected posture. The "official" paradigm of the learning process in
traditional legal education is the teacher-student interaction. The
paradigm of the learning process in a clinical context is the student as
problem solver for the client, drawing upon any resources that are
available-the clinical supervisor, fellow students, practitioners, legal
secretaries, form books, case files, court personnel, etc. In effect, the
clinical teacher is more than a teacher; his or her job is to create,
manage and administer a total learning system.
To create such a learning system one must first define learning objec-
tives. The lawyering competencies, defined generically as the result of
several years of collaborative effort, trial and error, at Antioch,
establish those objectives." The specific tasks assigned constitute the
context within which those competencies are manifested. Since students
responsible for dealing with client problems will solve a problem any
way they can, they are more likely to do so using their strongest skills
than trying to overcome their deficiencies. Students strongest in writ-
ten skills and legal analysis will use these in problem solving; students
strongest in negotiating skills and oral communications will use those.
Because the clinical teacher is caught between the responsibilities of
client service and the obligations of student teaching, the natural temp-
tation is to rely on students to do the things they do best; the writers
write, the talkers talk; those proficient in legal analysis write the legal
memos, while those proficient in oral communications do the fact find-
26 See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
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ing, interviewing, and even negotiating. Everyone learns how to survive
with the minimal possible learning, unless the teacher as "systems
manager" can design a strategy for insuring that students have to cope
with their deficiencies as well as utilize their strengths.
At Antioch, we developed the approach that each clinic had to specify
two "criterion" tasks which the student had to perform which assured
minimal proficiency in certain competencies: e.g., write a pleading,
prepare a legal memorandum, submit a satisfactory intake interview,
prepare a client file, or write a close-out memorandum. The "tasks"
were picked because they were predictably available no matter what
kinds of cases were the specialty of that particular clinic. Students had
to rotate to clinics with different types of tasks and demonstrate
minimal proficiency over the full range of a core set of competencies.
Without that kind of matching of student-to-task to clinic-to-competency,
there was no method of assuring a uniform minimum experience, no
method of utilizing clinical assignments as a remediation vehicle and no
method of knowing what a passing grade in a given clinic meant in
terms of lawyering competency.
As in any system, there had to be a designation of goals and objec-
tives, a description of the organization and procedures for reaching
those objectives, a deployment of personnel, equipment and logistics
consistent with goals, organization and procedures, and "feedback
loops" that provide for continual monitoring and assessment of the ade-
quacy of the system. What all this "translates" into is that any clinic
which specializes in a particular type or types of cases requires the
development of the following set of materials. First, a Clinic Manual
which sets forth the policies and procedures of the clinic, its educational
and service objectives, the references (law, statutes, cases, etc.) the stu-
dent must know to function in the clinic and the skills and procedures
the student must learn. Second, a Syllabus which provides a detailed
description of the educational objectives, methods, materials and
schedules of the clinic and specifies the particular task which provide
opportunities for the student to develop and demonstrate proficiency in
basic lawyering competencies. Finally, a Student/Case Management
Notebook, or its equivalent, which is essentially a device for keeping
track of the status of cases and the needs, performance and progress of
students. To help clinical supervisors construct those three basic tools
without having to reinvent the wheel and to insure the minimal uniform-
ity needed if students were not to have to learn a new system each time
they rotated to a different clinic, a general manual of "Policies, Pro-
cedures and Guidelines For the Administration of Antioch School of
Law Clinics" was developed."7
" This portion of the discussion draws directly upon the exceptional and
untiring work of Russ Cort, Carl Hartman and Eleanor Rider in preparation of
both the basic manual and illustrative manuals in Family Law, including a special
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The initial developmental focus at Antioch necessarily concentrated
on assuring that certain minimums were relatively uniformly achieved.
handbook for the word processing center, and in Statutory Entitlement which
concentrated on Unemployment Compensation and Employment Discrimination
Law.
The topics enumerated in the basic manual, together with the basic forms
included in the manual's Appendix, give a sense of the basic elements of the
system:
Assessing Needs in the realms of Education, Service, Administration and
Evaluation (defining service and educational objectives, role of participants,
characteristics of clients, constraints, problems to be anticipated)
Caseload/Caseflow in the Clinic
Intake: procedures and exceptions
Division records and Assignment to Attorney
Assignment of student for Intake
Methods of Assignment of Students to do Intake Interviews
Student Completion of Intake Assignment
Acceptance Criteria for the Routine Case
Acceptance Criteria and Procedures for Cases Requiring Unusual
Resources
Acceptance of Case Potentially Requiring the Involvement of more
than one Clinic (Cases with Multiple Areas of Law)
Closeout of Intake
Acceptance and Scope of Acceptance
File Organization and Maintenance: The File Jacket; The Main File,
the Documents and Correspondence File; Miscellaneous and
Additional Files
Location and Use of Files
Transfer of Cases by Outgoing Students
Computer Tracking of Attorney Caseloads
Transfer of Another Attorney
Close out of a Case which has been Accepted
Developing Methods to Deal with Caseload/Caseflow Management
What Can Be Done About Maintaining the Case File in the Clinic
Caseload Control
Desirable Caseloads
Monitoring Casework
Unforeseen Contingencies
What if not Enough Cases are Available
Assignment of Cases and Tasks to Students
The Problem of Preferential Assignments
Assignment of Students to a Clinic
Notification of Supervising Attorneys
Orientation of New Clinical Students
Transfer of Cases to Incoming Students
Maintaining Student Case Assignment Record and a Caseload/Stu-
dent Listing
Clinical Rounds
Grand Rounds
Case Review Conference with Students
Recording of Student Clinical Hours
Functions of Lists of Cumulative Hours
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That required an elaborate systems approach to clinical organization
which built upon the cumulative shared experience of an entire instruc-
tional staff. Without that level of sustained institutional investment, it
is doubtful that any one individual would have had the time, resources
or breadth of experience to create such systems. But once such systems
developed, they can be implemented elsewhere fairly readily.28
Clinical education as a system clearly involves more than the defini-
tion of lawyering competencies, the specification of tasks and the
development of managerial systems. There are other fundamental impli-
cations of a "systems approach" to clinical education that should be
treated as illustrative case studies in system design where a void now
exists.
First, designing an educational strategy seeking to internalize a code
of professional responsibility (and addressing lapses in professional
responsibility) raises problems that are at once unique and symptomatic
Approval of Student Hours
Grading of Clinical Students
Student Clinic Progress Files
Professional Responsibility
Counselling Students
General Considerations in Administration of Clinical Students
Integrating Client and Educational Needs
The forms developed included the following:
Eligibility and Intake Information
Student Case Assignment Record
Retainer
Acceptance Letter to Client
Case File Docket Sheet
Status Sheet
Documents File Index Sheet
Transfer Letter
Attorney Transfer Form
Case Disposition Form
"New Student" Letter
Caseload/Student Record
Basic Clinic Report
28 Because of the initial preoccupation with minimum competency, we have
yet to pay adequate attention to incentives for excellence and to design
"advanced lawyering tasks" which involve the same generic competencies set in
far more complex contexts. For example, the management of a complex anti-
trust, utility rate or discrimination case involves the same fundamental com-
petencies but appears to involve a different level of proficiency. Antioch did
attempt to provide exposure to more advanced lawyering assignments through a
required one-term internship in government and either an advanced concentra-
tion in trial advocacy, administrative advocacy, clinic management, or a senior
thesis focusing on policy analysis in an empirical context. Recently the option of
an "external clinic" in areas of practice not available within the clinic was added.
But none of these have been subjected to the same rigorous competency-based
scrutiny that characterized the "basic clinic."
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of the complex considerations that go into other seemingly mechanical
decisions (like the length of a clinical semester, the number of credits,
how a credit is earned, or responsibility for a case once a clinical
semester has ended). Second, designing a set of academic standards,
including graduation requirements, and developing assessment strate-
gies for assuring rigorous adherence to those standards pose still
another set of issues, issues made more complex by the diversity of the
student body. These clearly have implications not only for admissions
criteria but also for bar examinations. Third, clinical education raises
fundamental questions about faculty evaluation, retention and tenure
that tend to be glossed over in traditional legal education. Fourth and
finally, all of these in combination pose critical issues for the accredita-
tion process where the implications of clinical education come into direct
conflict with the current interpretation of substantive standards and
the process by which those standards are applied.
The discussion of these points which follows represents a personal
perspective evolved from ten years or more of wrestling with these
issues. In discussing each problem area, I advance specific proposals to
suggest the implications of applying a systems perspective. The pro-
posals should be viewed as illustrative of trying to view clinical educa-
tion as a problem of system design in the context of certain normative
commitments central to the way the profession has defined itself.
A. Professional Responsibility: Internalizing Normative Standards
Running a clinic can give rise to potential malpractice claims against
an individual faculty member or against the sponsoring law school for
lapses in professional responsibility by a student. 9 Sometimes the ques-
tionable behavior of a student rises to the level of a clear violation of
the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility as
adopted and modified in the particular jurisdiction. Sometimes the
behavior does not rise to that level but involves negligence, tardiness or
impropriety and places a clients legal rights in potential jeopardy even
if timely intervention or good luck prevents any actual harm from occur-
ing. Systems, deadlines, and checkpoints can be utilized to minimize the
likelihood of actual injury to a client.
' In most clinical programs students function under student practice rules,
are directly subject to the jurisdiction's Code of Professional Responsibility, and
may be directly liable or subject to disciplinary sanctions by the bar because the
student may be regarded as "retained counsel." In other clinical programs
students function in part as paralegals and in part as student practitioners in
administrative agency cases (e.g., prison discipline, social security, worker's com-
pensation), where they are not precluded by court rules governing the
unauthorized practice of law. In both situations, the supervising faculty member
may find himself or herself being sued or potentially subject to bar disciplinary
proceedings. The institution, as the "deep pocket," is likely to be sued for
damages.
19801
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
It is difficult for students to regard handing in a legal memorandum
late as constituting a capital offense when they have been accustomed
to handing in term papers, for example, after the given deadline. Work
handed in so late that it leaves inadequate time for review and revision
by the clinical supervisor gives rise to one kind of nightmare. Work
handed in so that one must pay secretarial overtime or secure commer-
cial copying because the school's facilities are closed poses a similar
problem, even though the student will tend to regard it as a "budgetary
problem" rather than a lapse in professional responsibility.
The lapse may be grave or trivial, but Disciplinary Rule 1-101 (B) pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer shall not further the application for admissions to
the bar of another person known by him to be unqualified in respect to
character, education, or other relevant attribute."' Therefore, the
safest procedure a law student can follow is to avoid any clinical pro-
gram if a mistake in judgment or a minor lapse can directly jeopardize
his or her entire legal career. Clinical programs can hardly flourish if
"virtue untested" is the only safe course for potential lawyers. Some
procedure must be available which treats clinical offenses as the
equivalent of juvenile offenses and similarly "seals" the record to pre-
vent unlapping stigmatism. But this in turn may entail a pregraduation
inquiry as to whether there has been an adequate showing of
"rehabilitation."
What happens in actual practice is that such lapses are virtually
ignored. The clinical supervisor may give a verbal or written reprimand,
but it is only in the gravest situation that a student will receive a failing
grade for a breach of professional responsibility. Moreover, the "good"
students are aware that they are somewhat immune from criticism or
reprimand because they have become junior colleagues protected by the
supervisor's needs. The clinical faculty member tends to rely on the
ablest students to do the last minute, around-the-clock research or
writing, or to revise a shoddy piece of work handed in by a less capable
or industrious student. That dependency generally protects him or her
from sanction for occasional lapses. The "poor" student who is censured
cries "equal protection" and feels that he or she has been singled out for
unfairly harsh treatment when others act similarly but are not similarly
censured. When that perception of inequity is coupled with charges that
the faculty supervisor is either racist or sexist, the kindest thing one
can say is that the atmosphere ceases to be conducive to learning.3
0 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 1-101 (B)
(1978).
"' Students are quick to point out that they are not the only ones who miss
deadlines and that failure of faculty to give adequate supervision, direction and
feedback, or failure of secretarial staff to give appropriate priority to client-
related papers should give rise to corresponding censure or sanctions. A "Clean
hands" doctrine emerges which implies that the faculty member can not hold
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If the only sanction available to a professor is to give a failing grade,
then the sanction will not be used because it is usually felt to be
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Many, if not most, clinics
tend to grade on a Pass-Fail basis which sharply limits the sanctions and
incentives available to a professor. Moreover, once a semester or a
clinical rotation is over, a final grade is viewed as closing the door on
any lapses of professional responsibility. Yet, in every situation at
Antioch where a major lapse of professional responsibility occurred, it
had always been preceded by seemingly minor lapses which were either
ignored or were effectively expunged because the student had received
a final grade from the previous clinical supervisor.
Clinical supervisors are reluctant to deal with seemingly minor lapses
for several reasons. First, each such incident takes on a semi-
confrontational aspect wherein a reprimand can give rise both to "due
process" questions and to emotionally charged love-hate, approval-
rejection dynamics because the student's sincerity, integrity, good
intentions and character are seemingly drawn into question. The per-
sonal dynamics that ensue can be highly destructive to the kind of col-
legial working relationships that is so essential to the effective opera-
tion of a clinic. Second, a great many derelictions involve students who
simply "slip between the cracks," and who are not available unless the
supervisor can somehow catch up with them. Students can be most
adept at shifting the burden to the clinical supervisor to hunt them
down in timely fashion. Third, because students in a clinic normally are
simultaneously enrolled in courses, the clinical supervisor is frequently
engaged in a process of negotiating for a student's time in direct com-
petition with an examination schedule or in implied competition with
more senior tenured faculty members who regard their course
assignments as sacrosanct.
All of these factors operate to insure that the only sanction which the
clinical instructor has, namely, to fail a student, is one that will almost
never be used. Accordingly, it becomes essential to develop a much
more finely tuned sanctioning system, free of some of the emotional
effect that otherwise attends expressions of disapproval. Conversely
that system ought to reward or somehow recognize impressively
diligent and conscientious performance.
The approach I would urge would be modelled after a traffic court
where the list of offenses is clearly enumerated and a "ticket" handed
out for each violation. The first "ticket" would simply constitute a warn-
ing; thereafter, points would accumulate. The record would be cumu-
students to standards if there is any lapse in his or her own supervision, clarity of
instructions, speed in returning drafts, etc. In this and other respects, the prob-
lems of professional responsibility in clinical programs correspond to the absence
of an adequate approach to upgrading acceptable norms of professional behavior
for the profession as a whole.
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lative, extending from one clinical semester to the next (patterns of con-
duct tend to be cumulative). One "point" would be charged for each
violation; two "points" would be charged where actual injury, including
severe inconvenience or increased work load, occurred to a client, fellow
student or clinical supervisor. The accumulation of two points within
any four month (one semester) period would require mandatory atten-
dance at the equivalent of "traffic school"-a one evening session
involving a review of the Code of Professional Responsibility and a
description of the consequences that follow from seemingly minor
infractions. The accumulation of three points would involve mandatory
attendance at "traffic school" for three sessions coupled with a set of
exercises or an examination. To this sanction others can be added:
restitution, mandatory community service, additional clinical assign-
ments. The accumulation of four points within any twelve month period
would result in some form of suspension from the clinic tantamount to
revocation of a "driver's license," as well as a loss of hours or
assignments accumulated, and an "incomplete" or a "failure" on the
transcript. The system should provide that the absence of any offenses
for a period of time, for example six months, would operate to erase
points accumulated for previous offenses.
Assuming that the clinical supervisor is the equivalent of the "traffic
cop" who hands out tickets, any such system will also involve the
development of a list of traffic offenses and some equivalent of the Traf-
fic Court. A panel of hearing examiners drawn from students, clients,
clinical supervisors, and classroom faculty would be created to conduct
any hearing in the event that a student should desire to contest a
"ticket." I would propose the following as a starting point for a list of
offenses:
1. Failure to comply with a reasonable work deadline for case
handling, intake, research, preparation of drafts, client
appointment or other routine assignment (including failure
to respond to a notice or note in the mailbox requesting the
student to contact the supervisor);
2. Failure to notify the supervisor, in timely fashion, of
substantial likelihood that completion of a clinical assign-
ment cannot be done within a time frame requested by a
supervisor;
3. Giving unauthorized legal advice to -a client or potential
client;
4. Failure to disclose any perceived conflict of interest to the
supervising attorney;
5. Making statements to a client that impugn the professional
competence of a supervising attorney;
6. Disclosing confidential information;
7. Failure to exercise due care in handling of case files and
materials related to clinical work;
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8. Failure to notify a client of developments in a case includ-
ing transfer of responsibility for the case to another stu-
dent or supervisor;
9. Postponing or seeking extensions of deadlines without just
cause and without express advance written permission
from the supervisor;
10. Failure to gain informed consent from a client for student
participation in the handling of a case;
11. Misleading the public or a client into believing that the stu-
dent is a lawyer;
12. Signing pleadings or other legal documents intended to be
signed by a lawyer;
13. Encouraging a client to act in a manner injurious to himself
or herself or encouraging a client to create false evidence;
14. Failure to obtain a written retainer except where the case
is by court appointment;
15. Failure to treat clients, witnesses and court personnel with
professional courtesy.
One may debate the merits or adequacy of the foregoing list. The
point I am urging, however, is that clinical programs must find a way of
heightening awareness to professional responsibility issues and must
pay attention to the development of a system that articulates and
enforces norms. The legal profession as a whole has been derelict in
policing itself for reasons analagous to those encountered in clinical pro-
grams.32 What is needed is a system that can flag seemingly minor
infractions immediately, that can operate evenhandedly towards the
most and the least able students, that can generate graded sanctions
that will have an educational effect, and that can recognize and reward
exemplary conduct. Whatever the system chosen, whatever the offenses
enumerated, one point is fundamental. If "learning by doing" has any
value at all, professional responsibility is an area that must be assigned
top priority. Otherwise, "learning by not doing" imparts another very
clear message-infractions will be tolerated, and professional respon-
sibility is less important than technical virtuosity. This is an area where
conceptualizing the clinical method as involving the design and adminis-
tration of a total learning environment may make a most important con-
tribution and indeed provide a model that the profession itself can
adopt.
B. Assessment: Academic Standards, Competency Assessment,
Graduation Requirements and Bar Examinations
Law school examinations, academic standards, graduation require-
ments and bar examinations all have one thing in common-at best they
32 See Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (1980).
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measure at various points in time the student's readiness to benefit
from one pedagogical method and to peform on one range of test instru-
ments. They do not measure the full range of professional competence,
nor do they measure potential to achieve competence utilizing clinical or
other non-traditional instructional methods.
Most academic standard systems are predicated on the same assump-
tions about readiness to learn, learning style, and sequence of learning.
They essentially define a lock step pace requiring a student to accumu-
late a certain number of credits within the first semester, or first year,
in order to remain in good standing. Failure to acquire the minimal
number of credits, and in some schools to maintain a minimum average,
results in academic probation or termination.
Some students will take longer to achieve proficiency in examination
taking and in the specific language and logic system entailed in legal
analysis. If there is only one method of instruction and one type of exa-
mination format, then there are basically three types of responses that
can be made, other than simply mechanically applying the rule of
meeting the credit-grade average minimums. These responses are: 1)
early identification of students who are likely to have test taking or
basic skills problems so that they can receive additional personal
instruction as early as possible; 2) use of immediate retesting by using
different hypotheticals following a failing examination after providing
immediate feed back, a model answer, or critiques of the original exa-
mination (while maintaining the same qualitative standards);33 3) alter
the points in time at which a certain minimal number of credits must be
accumulated so that in effect, some students would be on a three and
one-half or four year track with different initial pacing. Under such a
system the critical go-no-go decision would take place for some, not at
the end of the first year but either after one and one-half years or at the
end of the second year. 4 The introduction of a competency-based
approach to testing combined with the insertion of clinical opportunities
to develop and demonstrate basic lawyering competencies opens up an
entirely different range of opportunities in the design of the assessment
process and the design of academic standards.
" Professor Charles Kelso, a visiting professor at Antioch in 1975, did this
after noting that students, particularly minority students, approached law school
examinations as a game in which the object was to guess who wins and then
display as much knowledge of as many rules and cases as possible. By providing
for an immediate critique, feedback and retesting, he found that all but two of the
fifteen students involved passed the retest. The students reported that they had
never taken an examination where the objective was to demonstrate that they
could give reasoned analysis of the arguments for each side and where the out-
come predicted was far less important than the rationales advanced for justifying
the conclusion.
' One must recognize, however, the danger of economic exploitation of the
student, leading to the accumulation of staggering amounts of debt by students
who have no reasonable expectation of completing law school unless standards
are unconscionably lowered.
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Under most academic standard systems, grades are deemed to be self-
validating evidence of competence, but one rarely inquires what those
tests actually examine. If it is assumed that law schools are only in-
terested in whether lawyering competency is achieved and demon-
strated, a determination that there has been a failure to make progress
in achieving that competence depends on looking at all relevant
evidence. At Antioch, this meant that a task force read all of a student's
examinations stretching over the first year and also examined the stu-
dent's work products in the clinic. This "vertical" scrutiny of a student's
work revealed whether there was a learning curve that showed signs of
rising rapidly toward the end of the first year, but not rapidly enough to
accumulate the requisite number of credits. It also enabled us to deter-
mine that some examinations which had been assumed to test for legal
analytical ability did not do so. Finally, it enabled the task force to see if
there was a different level of competence in legal analysis manifested in
the clinic than that which was manifested in course examinations.
The introduction of alternative learning and testing methods signifi-
cantly altered our assessment of some but not all students having dif-
ficulty. The comparison of examinations and work products produced by
a single student from the beginning of law school onward provided an
informed estimate of the rate at which the student would achieve the
required level of proficiency. There still had to be a cut off point at
which a student was informed that time had run out. But where im-
provements were delayed, yet clearly discernible improvements in per-
formance, there was sound basis for permitting that student to remain
in school.
This methodology leads to advocating two complementary approaches
to academic standards not available in conventional settings. The first
approach is to provide students with alternative ways to demonstrate
proficiency in legal analysis; for example, adequate performance in
either the clinic or the classroom will be deemed satisfactory to permit a
student to continue into the second year. The second approach is to
institute a comprehensive professional board examination prior to the
beginning of the second year. It would be designed collaboratively by a
faculty team to utilize multiple testing methods (simulation, clinical,
multiple choice, essay examinations). Students could take those boards
in May of their first year and could, if they had encountered academic
difficulties, defer the boards to the end of the summer and participate in
an intensive summer remediation program in anticipation of the boards.
Further, it makes sense to institute advanced competency require-
ments as an integral part of graduation requirements. These could
include production of a portfolio of satisfactory work products, research
papers, or examinations to demonstrate minimal proficiency in fun-
damental lawyering competencies together with evidence of advanced
proficiency in some specialized lawyering skills.
A similar change needs to be made in bar examinations which do not
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purport to test for the full range of lawyering competencies and which
effectively reward test-taking ability rather than lawyering com-
petence. A number of factors contributed to a decision by the Commit-
tee of Bar Examiners of California to institute an experimental portion
of the bar examination designed to assess lawyering skills such as
counselling and advocacy." The experiment was designed in direct
response to the consistently lower pass rate of minorities on bar exa-
minations as well as in response to the fundamental question of whether
bar examinations actually test lawyering competency. 6 It remains to be
seen what the impact of that experiment will be, what divergence if any
will be found between performance on the conventional portion of the
examination and the experimental, and what the performance of minor-
ity candidates will be.
It will take continuing experimentation with alternative methods of
assessment and different experimental subjects to ascertain whether
significantly different results follow from the broadened concern with
lawyering competency, But to the extent that bar examinations begin to
incorporate such features as those in California, it can be anticipated
that this will have a major impact on law school curriculum, testing
methods and academic standards. Clinical programs themselves will
predictably become more rigorous in their instructional objectives and
more popular because they will be perceived as "bar preparation"
courses.
C. Faculty Evaluation, Retention and Tenure
The faculty of a traditional law school is not and does not think of
itself as a system or part of a system for the production of competent
" The assessment criteria were drawn directly from the various instruments,
criteria, rating sheets and formats developed at Antioch and supplied by Jean
Camper Cahn in response to an invitation by the Bar Examiners. Charles and
Jane Kelso, who were intimately involved in competency-based projects at
Antioch and Indiana University Law Schools, were involved in drafting instruc-
tions, refining the final evaluation criteria, designing scoring sheets and pro-
viding calibration aids for the judges. The test was conducted in assessment
centers set up in four different cities. Performance of students was videotaped;
trained actors and actresses were used for simulations. Applicants were various-
ly assigned the role of attorney for plaintiff and attorney for defendant. Attorney
for plaintiff was assigned the following tasks: client interview, designing a
discovery plan and interrogatories, preparation of a client for direct examination,
preparation of a trial brief and closing argument. Attorney for defendant was
assigned a different but equally matched mix of oral and written tasks: memoran-
dum for the file, client interviewing and counseling, draft of counter proposal and
letter to client, opening statement, reply to points and authorities memorandum
and cross examination. The instructions to the participants specified what was to
be included and implicitly conveyed the criteria that would be used for evaluation
purposes.
' Letter, supra note 6.
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lawyers. It is a collection of individuals, preferably with impressive
academic credentials, a resume that includes publication of an impres-
sive list of scholarly articles, casebooks or treatises, and some substan-
tive area of specialization. No particular teaching ability is required;
that is assumed to be something that can be picked up "on the job." Nor
is any depth of experience in practice necessary, though that has been
regarded lately as more desirable than it used to be.37 The conventional
faculty functions not as a team but atomistically, coming together at
faculty meetings as rarely as possible, and addressing problems of
academic policy and administration through a few standing committees
such as curriculum, personnel, admissions and academic standards.
Evaluation of conventional faculty focuses primarly upon their
publications and claims to scholarly distinction. It is desirable, but not
essential, to be a good "classroom performer," but popularity among
students is not necessary, and in some cases is regarded as a real liabil-
ity, as if the instructor has lowered the tone by catering to the masses.
Law school faculties are expected to have a higher percentage of
tenured members than the undergraduate or other graduate divisions of
a university. Turnover is expected to be low. Salaries are expected to
be in the $30,000-$45,000 range, comfortable but by no means com-
parable to that which could be earned in a lucrative private practice.
Faculty members are theoretically expected to devote substantially all
their time to teaching and scholarship, but in practice it is understood
that they are free and even expected to augment their incomes by
various consultantships, "of counsel" retainers, etc. In terms of teaching
load, the ABA establishes a maximum of sixteen credit hours per year,'
which could mean two large, required courses per semester. But that
would be regarded as a truly onerous load, to be tolerated only by new
members of the faculty trying to earn their spurs and gain tenure.
Ideally, the load is one large course in a subject tested on the bar exami-
nation and one small seminar in an area of interest or expertise of the
particular faculty member. The only intrusion on virtual autonomy
comes in negotiating the assignment of large courses and, to a lesser
degree, sorting out the mix of seminars and small classes so that the
"core subjects," particularly first year courses, are taught by full-time
faculty, so that, in the aggregate, there is a reasonable balance or diver-
sity in the overall curriculum offerings. Legal writing, moot court and
other skill related courses are taught by instructors or others usually
lacking faculty status. Adjunct faculty are available as "cheap labor" to
augment the full-time faculty and plug the holes in the curriculum left
after the full-time faculty has had its pick.
" See Devitt, Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Law
Suits?, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 631 (1980).
3 ABA, APROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 14
(1979) (paragraph 404) [hereinafter cited as APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS).
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The rewards of academia are partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic.
There is status, leisure, the opportunity to pursue scholarly interests,
and the personal satisfaction of attracting a few of the brightest
students as proteges. The ego satisfaction that comes from teaching a
large class with consumate artistry is akin to what an actor in a star
role with a captive audience or the conductor of an orchestra may feel.
The pay, fringe benefits, and the job security all combine to make
academic life relatively idyllic; or at least did so until the advent of the
sixties when student activism, concerns over poverty, racism, sexism,
Viet Nam, consumer fraud, student participation, admissions policies,
and grading systems invaded even these hallowed halls. At present,
those concerns appear to be diminishing in intensity and some measure
of the old tranquility against prevails.
When one examines clinical legal education, it would be difficult to
find a more sharply contrasting profile or a more divergent view of the
role of faculty. Clinical faculty are generally regarded within academia
as of inferior status. Those who seek jobs as clinical supervisors often
do so because they lack the academic and scholarly qualifications
required by normal recruitment standards. Clinical positions have
become a "backdoor" into the faculty. The turnover rate is high, the
composition of clinical faculty more diverse. The amount of conventional
scholarly output expected has been low and the types of manuals, briefs,
etc. that clinical programs produce are not deemed worthy of the
designation of scholarship within the legal academic world. Clinical
faculty give much more individual attention to students and the rela-
tionship is, of necessity, closer to that of the relationship between a
senior and junior partner or associate. Where there are a number of
them, clinical supervisors function as a loosely knit team, though still
closer to solo practitioners. They help each other, engage in team
teaching, provide assistance in drafting pleadings or interrogatories-if
only because most clinical faculty have not themselves had much ex-
perience in the practice of law. To compound the problems they con-
front, many clinical faculty may have internalized a sense of inferiority
that comes from academia on the one hand and from private practi-
tioners on the other who regard the kinds of cases handled in law school
clinical programs as low prestige cases involving lower class clientele.
Their salary, fringe benefits and chances of tenure are considerably
lower than that of traditional faculty teaching traditional courses.
Initially, clinical courses were regarded as mere skill courses, reduc-
ing lawyering to the equivalent of being a competent plumber or electri-
cian. The advent of concern with lawyering competencies and the con-
ceptual, definitional and methodological problems that these concerns
have posed has, in turn, provided clinical law teaching with its first
clear claim to intellectual respectability. Most of what clinical law
teachers do, and in fact must do, is still regarded somewhat disdainfully
and apprehensively by most faculties. When a systems analysis of
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clinical legal education is applied to faculty recruitment, evaluation
criteria, and tenure, it has significant but largely unrealized implica-
tions.
Law schools have tenure, law firms do not-clinical programs are
somewhere in between. At the very least, integrating the concept of
tenure into a systems approach to clinical education means that the con-
cept itself must undergo significant change. For clinical faculty, tenure
cannot be tantamount to perpertual immunity from scrutiny because
the consequences of poor clinical teaching performance for clients, for
students and for other teachers who have to take up the slack are grave.
As in a law firm, the degree of interdependence is greater, and if one
partner or associate puts in fewer billable hours or generates less
business it has consequences for everyone including that partner or
associate.
Analytically, tenure has never meant anything other than a shift in
the burden of proof for reappointment. Until tenure is granted, the indi-
vidual faculty member has the burden of proving that he or she should
be reappointed. Once tenure is granted the burden of proof shifts to the
institution to demonstrate "cause" why the individual should not be
reappointed. In practice this means that tenured faculty are not subject
to regular evaluations. It also means that the institution can never bear
the burden of proof involved in demonstrating "cause" because the con-
sequence in academia is tantamount to capital punishment.
A balance needs to be struck between the ability of a clinical faculty
member to gain some greater degree of security after the investment of
years of energy in building a clinical program and the institution's need
on behalf of students, clients, and other clinical faculty to subject that
faculty member to some form of periodic scrutiny. Accordingly, I would
submit that tenure for clinical faculty has to entail at least a periodic
evaluation every third year and that evaluation is meaningless unless
the institution's burden of proof is changed to incorporate different
categories of "cause" with different consequences flowing from a finding
of each type of "cause."
The traditional definition of cause has entailed a showing of clear
incompetence or total unfitness. The line between one's private life and
one's professional life was clear and virtually absolute. In the context of
clinical teaching, the line is blurred, at least in so far as private conduct
might result in disbarrment or related sanction by the bar. If clinical
teachers have to be "role models," at the very least they have to remain
members of the bar "in good standing."39 A finding of cause may be
based on action which warrants loss of confidence in professional com-
One exception to this which must be flagged is where the conduct that
generates possible discipline by the bar involves principled challenges to
disciplinary rules of questionable validity such as those prohibiting solicitation,
barratry, maintenance and advertising.
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petence, including breaches of professional responsibility, in dealing
with students, in teaching, in client service activities or in clinical super-
vision. This would manifestly include an act leading to disbarment or a
clearly justifiable suit for malpractice by a client or other party.
In the context of an ongoing clinical program, with all the responsibi-
lity that it entails, there is another kind of "cause" to be enu-
merated -conduct which over a prolonged period of time results in
other clinical faculty members having to bear an inequitable burden in
order to compensate for the defective, inadequate or substantially defi-
cient performance of another. In theory the same standard applies or
should apply in conventional teaching where other faculty members
have to take up the slack left by another. In clinical programs, however,
the consequences are so grave in terms of injury to clients, as well as in-
adequate supervision in teaching of students, that the "tortious" impact
of substantial neglect or non-performance is felt much more swiftly and
with far more severe consequences.
In the clinical setting, one must not only alter the standards involved
in the showing of "cause" so that they address issues of competence,
professional responsibility, and neglect of duties at a much lower
threshold, but one must also alter the consequences of a finding of
cause. If cause results solely in termination, then faculty members will
be highly protective of each other if only out of the awareness: Ask not
"for whom the bell tolls .. .40 As a result, different categories of cause
must be established and different consequences must flow from each
category if concerns over accountability are to be balanced against
legitimate needs for security.
There must be one kind of cause that explicitly acknowledges life
situations in which circumstances beyond one's control ranging from
age, to physical illness, to debilitating psychological stress, result in
substantially diminished capacity to carry one's fair share of the
teaching, supervisory and practice responsibilities. In some cases the
condition may be temporary, in other cases permanent. Because clinical
programs are expensive, schools cannot afford to carry "dead weight"
indefinitely, but it does not follow that they should be devoid of humani-
ty in dealing with situations involving clinical faculty. The nature of the
stress associated with clinical supervision in fact makes the actuarial
probability of such situations considerably higher in clinical than in con-
ventional teaching. Any number of responses short of severance may be
appropriate, such as reduction in work load with a corresponding reduc-
tion in pay, temporary suspension from service, or requirement of
restitution to individuals or the institution. In some law firms, when
senior partners have reached a point where they are not generating the
quantity of business needed or are virtually incapable of discharging
," J. Donne, Meditation XVII, reprinted in NORTON'S ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE 91.7 (Rev. ed. 1968).
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certain responsibilities, they are still kept on the firm's letterhead and
provided an office (sometimes at the individual's own expense) but their
compensation drops radically. Presently, faculty pay scales tend to
operate mechanically, being based on previous year's salary plus yearly
increments reflecting cost of living, length of service and "merit"
increases. Clearly, a finding of involuntary cause, whether temporary or
permanent, should give rise to a much broader and more flexible range
of sanctions than those normally associated with tenure.
The same flexibility should exist in another category of situations
where personal problems, marital conflict or just plain exhaustion result
in a "tenured" clinical faculty member turning in clearly deficient or
barely marginal performances. Unless one creates a category of "cause"
that is expressly denominated "remediable cause" resulting in a kind of
"shape up or ship out" contract, this kind of lapse will be overlooked by
common consent. While the same flexibility in sanctions mentioned
above must be available here, there must be, in addition, a conscious
and explicit attempt to define contractually the nature of the effort the
individual must make within the next year in order to be continued in a
"tenured" position. In effect, a finding of "remediable cause" should
result in a one year reappointment that is designated a terminal reap-
pointment unless the individual meets explicit performance standards
specified at the outset.
The issue of "cause" and the standards governing potential loss of
tenured status simply portray in extremis the persuasive problem
involved in faculty evaluation. A systems approach requires a change
not only in concepts of tenure but also in the prevailing approach to
evaluation and contract renewal.
The evaluation of clinical faculty tends to be a popularity contest.
Since it is assumed that nothing worthy of designation as scholarship
will be produced, the only factor for non-clinical faculty to consider
other than student popularity is "congeniality" which gets called "col-
legiality" but amounts to "faculty popularity." Since faculty members
who become advocates for students may find themselves unpopular with
other faculty, clinical faculty members find themselves contestants in
two popularity contests with two very different groups of judges.
A systems approach to faculty evaluation in a clinical context defines
the teaching role as the design and management of a system to produce
lawyering competence (learning) and client service. Two consequences
for faculty evaluation flow from this. First, evaluation of performance
should flow from an "output inquiry," determining whether students
learn and whether clients are served. Second, the process of faculty
evaluation in a clinic must be set in a broad context because the design
and management of this learning system is inherently a dynamic pro-
cess requiring constant growth and change, as well as coping with the
unknown.
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In short, assessing teaching competence is like assessing lawyering
competence. One can define minimums as reflected in specific categories
of outputs, but one must create vehicles to encourage excellence which
will invariably be of such an individualized nature as to resist conven-
tional definition. Otherwise, in a field where expectations are so vague
and undefined, anxiety over adequate performance and over contract
renewal can deliberately lead the clinical faculty to develop a student
constituency. Developing a student constituency at any cost may, in
turn, mean relaxing standards if the rigorous application of standards
will alienate students who will then see faculty evaluation as their
opportunity for revenge. Experience leads me to believe that if one
wishes to take evaluation of clinical teachers seriously then one has to
evaluate in a context that promotes growth rather than one that merely
generates insecurity.
This objective of individualized evaluation has three consequences.
One, there must be considerable specificity in defining what a faculty
member should produce in order to secure reappointment; two, the
criteria used in defining "scholarship" for purposes of faculty reappoint-
ment must be broadened; and three, the reappointment determination
should simply be a byproduct of a strategy to encourage both profes-
sional and institutional development on the part of the individual faculty
member.
How can the first consequence, specificity in defining what a faculty
member should produce in order to secure reappointment, best be met?
One approach might be to specify in advance that an "output audit"
would include an evaluation of case files of clients served, syllabus and
clinic management strategies utilized, and an examination of work pro-
duct files of students (including drafts, critiques of drafts, and revisions)
hopefully showing that the student profited from the critique. Because
this will doubtless be coupled with some kind of student evaluation
regarding their perception of the adequacy of the supervision they
received and the nature of the learning they underwent, it is critically
important to provide the faculty member with an opportunity for pre-
sentation at his or her best. For example, the faculty member could be
permitted to select a set of case files or student work products or a tape
recorded clinical teaching session, or a videotape of a simulation exer-
cise that exemplifies the teacher's best. In short, the teacher must be
encouraged to think in terms of those products, outputs, or activities
that evidence his or her capacity to create and manage a learning
system which imparts lawyering competence and an internalized sense
of professional responsibility. This should also be reflected in the
presentation of student work products that evidence learning and
growth as a result of participation in that learning system. Such stan-
dards decrease the subjective "popularity contest" aspect of faculty
evaluation and hopefully provide the clinical teacher with an invitation
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to substitute objective evidence so as to reduce the liklihood of unfair or
arbitrary judgments.
Meeting the objective of individualized evaluation also must have the
consequence of broadening the criteria used in defining "scholarship"
for purposes of faculty reappointment. Clinical teachers necessarily
engage in different forms of educational innovation or experimentation
in order to shape a clinic. The development of manuals, grading criteria,
scoring sheets, simulation exercises, intensive instructional materials in
substantive and procedural law, case management systems, and unique
patterns of delegation and quality control all constitute investments in
educational innovation that should be regarded as forms of scholarship
in the field of pedagogy. Likewise, particularly outstanding appellate
briefs, pleadings, or creative settlement agreements constitute
demonstrations of professional competence as role model, teacher and
practitioner and should also be regarded as scholarship in the sense that
they represent a contribution to the available body of knowledge and
materials which can be utilized by students, clinical teachers and practi-
tioners in the future. Finally, clinical education, viewed as systems
management, is often the result of a team effort-the team importantly
includes students as well as other clinical supervisors. Conventional
definitions of scholarship stress "solo" works, and yet real progress in
defining competency criteria, rating sheets, and management systems
require enormous investments of time and usually require team efforts
if they are to be of continuing utility and of use by other clinicians. Our
notions of scholarship have to acknowledge that intellectual effort can
take many forms and can take place in a group context as well, or
better, than that done in isolation.
Thirdly, reappointment must be the byproduct of a strategy to encou-
rage individual and institutional development. A clinical supervisor
often feels as though he or she is on a treadmill from which there is no
escape, except to the more manageable environment of the classroom.
Student expectations and demands for access to clinical faculty are
significantly greater than that levied on classroom faculty. This access
is likely to have been encouraged, unwittingly or not, by the clinical
faculty member because it is a genuine source of personal satisfaction to
both parties and because it generates popularity and constituency which
can aid a clinical faculty member seeking reappointment or eventual
tenure. But such access, after a time, increases the sense of being over-
burdened. If each student expects an hour of supervisory time each
week, and if the clinical supervisor in turn conducts clinically related
seminars, case rounds, and regularly scheduled classes, there will be
little time left for the clinical instructor to cope with caseload demands.
The result is a partially self-induced "burn-out."
In this context, evaluation for purposes of securing reappointment
has only negative connotations. It is one more burden for a person who
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feels overburdened already; the best that can enure is "more of the
same," the worst is non-renewal. Neither is very appealing once the ini-
tial novelty of teaching has worn off. As a general rule, negative sanc-
tions at best prevent certain kinds of undesirable behavior and produce
various avoidance (or game playing) reactions. They rarely induce affir-
mative responses, promote growth, increase enthusiasm or unleash
creative energies. That requires positive, not negative, sanctions. And
for clinical teachers, generally regarded as second class citizens in the
academic world, there are precious few incentives. It take an unusually
self-sufficient person to sustain the same level of energy, year in and
year out, given the paucity of intrinsic or extrinsic rewards for clinical
faculty. Any reward available tends to suffer by comparison with the
rewards available to non-clinical faculty.
It makes far more sense, therefore, to try to let the products which
form the basis for evaluation be generated as part of an explicit plan for
personal, professional and institutional development, and to reward the
systematic implementation of that plan at discrete "milestones." Two
complementary strategies might generate a different and more positive
dynamic. Once again, they involve the creation of a "system" different
from that associated with traditional legal education. These strategies
are respectively a variant on "the learning contract"" as it has
developed in higher education, a "mini-grant" program to enable a
clinical faculty member to cover the expenses of a project or even to
hire an assistant to relieve him or her of some duties so as to free up
time to bring a project to completion.
Clinical teachers generally are so busy responding to demands and
crises that they have little or no time to plan. One consequence of
stressing that clinical education involves the creation and management
of a learning system is that it requires the investment of considerable
energy and time to create or refine any component of such a system.
Unfortunately, day-to-day demands tend to leave neither time, re-
sources, energy or incentive for a developmental investment. If in anti-
cipation of any acadmic year, a clinical faculty member were expected to
draw up a learning contract with two central objectives-professional
development of the faculty member and institutional development
related to clinical education, scholarship, or client problems-then two
major consequences would follow. First, the faculty member would have
defined some goals, the attainment of which would provide a sense of
" A learning contract is essentially a plan that designates the goals a student
wishes to accomplish, the means by which the student proposes to accomplish
them, the means by which the student will demonstrate accomplishment and the
intervals at which the student will submit agreed-upon products or other forms of
evidence. The use of a learning contract for faculty is extraordinary because it
makes explicit an obligation of continuous learning, development and contribu-
tion as integral and essential to adequate performance as a faculty member.
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closure and progress generally missing from clinical teaching. Second,
the faculty member would have defined the standards and terms upon
which he or she should be evaluated. The learning contract should
address the clinical faculty member's concern that he or she acquire
new skills, knowledge or proficiency so as to increase "marketability,"
and where a prior evaluation noted deficiencies, those should be ex-
plicitly addressed as part of the professonal growth dimensions of the
contract. Equally important, the learning contract should address in-
stitutional needs such as developing and refining appropriate systems,
developing manual or mini-courses in substantive and procedural areas,
experimenting with new delivery systems and new technologies, and ex-
panding the body of knowledge on competency-assessment and the rela-
tion of professional competence to traditional testing systems like the
LSAT or the bar examination. It is not enough to define those objec-
tives and establish timetables. Each clinical faculty member should
designate one or more persons as advisors or an an advisory panel to
provide feedback and critique. Those advisors might be drawn from
within or outside the institution, but their importance lies in their abili-
ty to provide a relevant world of approval, feedback, and assistance that
is now otherwise available. Further, the comments, critiques and evalua-
tions of that advisory panel can be utilized to make the evaluation pro-
cess a far more balanced and objective inquiry.
The development, negotiation and approval of such a learning con-
tract require the designation of a prestigious and supportive adminis-
trator to assist, to comment and to approve; but once approved, the con-
tract does two things. It makes the terms of evaluation more tangible
and it creates a built in pressure toward personal development that
operates as a counterveiling force to the myriad crises and demands of
clinical teaching.
This strategy places evaluation in the context of personal, profes-
sional and institutional development. It should be coupled with the pro-
vision of positive incentives as an institutional expression of the value,
prestige and importance the institution places on clinical faculty
members' continuing growth and contribution. Establishment of a mini-
grant program, with appropriate provision for publicizing awards and
providing for publication or production of the products, could signifi-
cantly improve the esteem with which clinical faculty are regarded by
both themselves and others. An award of a relatively small amount of
dollars to facilitate some project, purchase some student research,
secretarial or supervisory assistance, secure computer time, or by-pass
institutional red tape in setting up a conference or symposium would
have a pronounced motivational effect. The principle point is that just
as clinical faculty themselves are engaged in the design, creation and
management of a learning system, so too they must understand that
their own continuing growth, learning and development is essential to
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the health and vitality of the clinical learning system they are charged
with operating.
IV. SYSTEMS DESIGN AND QUALITY CONTROL THROUGH ACCREDITATION:
THE PROBLEM OF INNOVATION
Clinical education represents one, but only one, of a number of poss-
ible experimental approaches one might take to educational innovation
in law."2 Any serious attempt to innovate on a major scale, however,
involves a concomitant commitment of resources. One may put "all one's
eggs in one basket" as Antioch did with clinical education, or one may
set up an optional experimental track as Southwestern University Law
School did in attempting to redesign a competency-oriented law school
curriculum. But unless infinite resources are available, the decision to
innovate on a significant scale involves the decision to forego other
types of expenditures. This promptly brings a law school into conflict
with the accreditation process, as it currently operates. 3
The function of accreditation is to protect the public interest"-to
2 It would be just as possible to innovate radically in other ways. For
instance, use of emerging technology in minicomputers, microfiche, telecom-
munications and video might make possible a "law school" where the student's
home was the classroom, where programmed instruction transmitted via phone
or cable to home computers provided highly interactive instruction and testing,
and where legal research was taught using Westlaw, Lexis or Juris terminals
supplemented by the skimpiest introduction to traditional research materials.
" The ABA's accrediting authority stems from two sources: the judiciary of
each state (or in some cases, the legislature, which determines who may seek
admission to practice before its courts, and grant-making agencies of the
federal government-primarily the new Department of Education which deter-
mines what institutions are eligible to seek public funds and which normally
delegates that function to "private" accrediting bodies such as regional ac-
crediting bodies or, in the case of law, the American Bar Association. Foreward
to APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 38. Both sources of accrediting
power-the state judiciary and the federal government-tend to defer
automatically to the ABA's determination. A grant of provisional or full approval
by the ABA thus enables graduates of that school to sit for the bar and enables
that institution to be eligible to participate in major student aid and other grant
or loan programs. Some states have chosen to impose additional requirements
(E.g., New York which requires more classroom hours than the ABA. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Requirements for Admission to Legal Practice in US,
New York LXXIX (Revised 4th ed. 1968). Indiana requires particular subjects not
required by the ABA. See generally id. at LXXVII. Other states have chosen to
provide alternate routes by which students from non-ABA accredited law schools
might secure admission to practice (E.g., California with its "baby bar," id. at LX-
XVI, Wisconsin, West Virginia and Mississippi with their diploma privilege, id. at
LXXVIII to LXXX, and Virginia with its provision for reading for the bar.
See generally id. at LXXX). Despite the exceptions, the ABA exercises the
predominant influence in determining accreditation, and lacking accreditation, a
school will be hard put to attract students.
" See APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 38, at 1. "The American Bar
Association is virtually and actively interested in ways and means of bringing
about the improvement of the legal profession." Id. at paragraph 101.
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prevent students from being defrauded by institutions which take their
money but fail to provide an adequate education, to prevent the public
at large from placing reliance on degrees that are meaningless, and to
insure that public funds will only go to those institutions which meet
certain minimal standards. This licensing function thus requires that the
educational process have a certain integrity and substance, but it also
has another purpose: to encourage, or at least not to discourage, innova-
tion and experimentation in education which will advance the state of
the art and lead, hopefully, to improvement or new approaches and
techniques.
Accreditation is not supposed to freeze the educational process or
impose some monolithic mold. In law it tends to. The reason for this
goes, in part, to the nature of the standards and in part to the advocacy
function which the ABA plays for law schools vis-a-vis universities; and
advocacy which views law schools as surplus producing centers that can
support deficit generating departments or subsidize the escalating cen-
tral administrative costs of the overall university.
The Council on Legal Education has over the years developed, refined
and expanded the standards necessary to secure ABA approval-the
sine qua non, for all practical purposes, of sitting for the bar.45 Those
standards, together with the compilation of interpretations which have
evolved over the past ten years,46 essentially set certain minimum re-
quirements dealing with curriculum," faculty,4" physical plant,49 library,."
and tenure.' Meeting those requirements costs money and the amount
of money is constantly rising due in part to inflation, in part to the me-
dian faculty salary requirement, in part to skyrocketing library costs
and in part to increased overhead charges by the school. Compliance has
also become increasingly costly as the requirements have been made
more stringent. And once a school has met the original standards, it is
under an obligation to show continuous improvement on all fronts, and
cannot simply rest on its laurels.2
Facilities once deemed adequate are no longer adequate. The number
of faculty required has increased so that now a 30:1 ratio of full time
faculty to students is deemed essential to meet qualitative standards.
3
4 See note 43 supra.
See, e.g., ABA, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPRO-
VAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1978) [hereinafter cited as INTERPRETATIONS].
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 38, at 8-12.
4 Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 22-23.
50 Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 38-41.
12 Id. at 2. "An approved school shall seek to exceed the minimum require-
ments of the Standards." Id. at paragraph 105.
" INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 46, at 18.
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Similarly, one must occupy a building utilized exclusively for law school
purposes;54 the library must contain all specified sets of statutes,
reports, treatises, etc. and the minimal book budget for the library must
not only maintain all current collections and subscriptions but must in-
clude an additional allowance for acquisition of new treatises, law books,
and law-related books.5 The library must also be staffed at all times
with a professionally trained and credentialled librarian and must be
open a sufficient number of hours to meet the needs of the students and
faculty. 6
Faculty salaries must equal or exceed the median of faculty salaries in
the geographical area in which the school is located. 7 A tenure policy is
obligatory. The ability of a school to "attract and retain" 9 quality facul-
ty will be judged in part in terms of faculty turnover rate, opportunity
for scholarly writing and publications,' sabbatical,6 adequate research
assistants, and secretarial and support services." The calibre of the stu-
dent body and of the educational program as a whole will be judged in
part by the bar passage rate, 3 although a bar survey course may not be
offered for credit or made a requirement for graduation, 4 and also in
large part by the median LSAT score. 5 And academic attrition, as well
as the willingness of a school to sever students who are having academic
difficulties, will be viewed as a factor in determining whether substan-
dard students are being admitted purely for the exploitative purpose of
extracting tuition.
Those rising "quality" standards are being steadily revised upward in
part to prevent the proliferation of low quality law schools. The relation
between those "input" standards and the effectiveness of the educa-
tional process has yet to be demonstrated, but the "needs" of deans, law
54 APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 38, at 22. "The physical facilities
shall be under the exclusive control and reserved for the exclusive use of the law
school." Id. at paragraph 702(a). This section also provides that if "the facilities
are not under the exclusive use, then the arrangements must permit proper
scheduling of all law classes and other law school activities." Id.
" Id. at 19-20, 32-35.
6 Id. at 21 (paragraph 605).
" Id. at 14 (paragraph 405(a)).
SId. at 15 (paragraph 405(d)). An example of the tenure policy is set out. Id.
at 28-31.
" Id. at 14 (paragraph 405(a)).
60 Id. at 15 (paragraph 405(b)).
6I /d.
62 Id. (paragraph 405(c)).
' Id. at 8 (paragraph 301(a)).
64 Id. (paragraph 302(h)).
See, e.g., id. at 16-17 (paragraphs 501-0)3).
I d. at 5 (paragraph 209). See also INrERTRETATIONS, supra note 46, at 7.
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professors, and law librarians are somehow deemed to be self-validating
if only to prevent law schools from being exploited as profit centers by
universities. 7 In short, virtually unsurmountable entry barriers have
been raised to any new law school designed to function in a traditional
mold. The legitimacy of that "restraint of trade" by our learned profes-
sion is at least subject to question, but it ceases to be defensible when it
has the direct result of impeding innovation and experimentation.
What if genuine efforts at innovation in legal education cause a school
to violate the accreditation standards because of competition for limited
resources? Accreditation procedures provide that a school may petition
the Council for a variance if it proposes to offer a program of legal
education contrary to the standards and if the proposal is consistent
with the general purposes of the standards. 8 Since among the enu-
merated purposes are "ways and means of bringing about the improve-
ment of the legal profession," 8 it would appear that there should be at
least an initial receptiveness. But to my knowledge, no variances have
ever been granted.
Serious innovation requires an approach to experimentation that
actively encourages such innovation and provides the basis for a struc-
tured presentation to defend the innovation. I would propose two
approaches. The first and more limited approach would be to specify
that innovation or experimentation should be designated as an affirm-
ative defense to a finding of non-compliance and the innovation. The sec-
ond would be a more fundamental approach seeking to avoid the in-
terim, stop-gap nature of requests to suspend the application of one
standard or another.
There are three kinds of situations where innovation is most likely to
be an acceptable affirmative defense to nonconformity with accredita-
tion standards. One can be labelled design variance, that is, the violation
is the direct result of the design of the experiment because the experi-
ment seeks to test, question, challenge, modify, supplement or supplant
one of the assumptions underlying traditional legal education. An exam-
ple would be where an admissions policy experimentally attempts to
challenge the prevailing reliance on the LSAT; another might seek, as a
matter of design, to experiment radically with decentralized instruction
in the home combined with a centralized assessment process using the
emerging availability of home computers operating by cable or
telephone to centralized research, substantially eliminating all but the
smallest book collection necessary to teach the rudiments of traditional
legal research.
The second situation where innovation should be designated as an
affirmative defense to a finding of noncompliance with accreditation
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 34, at 4 (paragraph 202).
Id. at 24 (paragraph 802).
Id. at 1 (paragraph 101).
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standards can be labelled the resource allocation (or resource priority
variance). This variance would be available where compliance with a
standard would so distort resource allocation and internal priorities
that it would interfere with an alternative use of resources which would
be of greater utility if devoted to costs associated with implementing an
experiment. Variances involving capital expenditures on libraries and
other facilities come to mind. For example, in clinical programs the
dispersion of library books to clinical service sites and the emphasis on
form books, pleading "banks," and duplicate sets of statutes and court
opinions may render the library deficient under the standards in terms
of treatises, law reviews, or law-related materials.0
The third situation involves personnel variances in selection, classifi-
cation, and utilization. A clinical program may operate best with a
twelve-month year, may involve the use of "graduate students" or a
non-faculty category of personnel, may involve no tenure or a radical or
modification of conventional tenure, may involve higher turnover rate,
may result in less time being allocated for traditional scholarly pursuits.
In short, it may necessitate a governance system suited better to a law
firm than the conventional faculty-centered mode of governance.
The above discussion represents a preliminary attempt to specify
some of the categories of variances that should be codified if innovation
is to be encouraged. If variances are to be utilized, then it is necessary
to consider the applicable standard of proof and burden of proof.
Variances could be rendered meaningless, and conceivably non-existent,
if inspection teams are free to second-guess the institution and require
the school to prove that the non-compliance was absolutely necessary to
achieve the experimentation. There is always some reallocation of
resources that can be suggested that might have accomplished a greater
accomodation between conventional input standards and the resources
needed for innovation. Additionally, the nature of the budgetary process
involves so many complex interrelations that a test of "absolutely
necessary" as judged by outsiders is one which few if any innovations
can meet. The more appropriate approach would be a "reasonable
nexus" test; did the school have a reasonable basis related to innovation
for making choices that resulted in the alleged non-compliance? Some
discretion and some latitude, even for error, must be allowed if experi-
mentation is to be fostered.
The problem with an approach that specifies that innovation or exper-
imentation should be designated as an affirmative defense to non-
compliance with accreditation standards is that the school continues
under the cloud of suspicion that marginal compliance is being tolerated
as an act of largesse, and that otherwise intolerable conditions respect-
ing quality are being permitted simply because the school means well
70 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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and is trying to accomplish good things. It never permits the school a
forum in which to make its own affirmative case, but instead leaves it in
a position where its central strengths can only be introduced as a kind
of mitigating circumstance or worse, as akin to a plea of "not guilty by
reason of insanity." Further, a designation that a school is continually
out of compliance and is saved only by piecemeal exceptions still
stigmatizes that school.
A more fundamental approach needs to be developed which includes
both the standards and the use of a visiting team. Where innovation is
involved, it takes a period of time and considerable continuity on the
part of evaluators to determine whether the progress hoped for is being
made, and to place in context the confusion and turmoil so often atten-
dant upon experimentation. It requires that the "evaluator" begin with
a sympathetic and supportive attitude. This means that the choice of in-
spector ought to be one that is concurred in by both the school and the
ABA. Further, the inspector should be a multi-year role so that the
school is not placed under the burden of constantly "educating" new
inspectors as to what it is trying to accomplish.
This second and more fundamental approach to experimentation in
legal education should seek to avoid the interim, stop-gap nature of
requests to suspend the application of one standard or another. Accord-
ingly, a different standard is needed. As this article has attempted to
show, a standard by itself will not suffice; that standard must operate
within an institutional structure that provided both a forum and a pro-
cess appropriate to the peculiar challenge inherent in significant innova-
tion. In this case, the appropriate standard is itself less a standard than
a mode of inquiry suitable to considering whether the proposed innova-
tion advances the fundamental purpose of the accreditation process. To
discharge fully its commitment to fostering innovation in legal educa-
tion, the ABA should undertake to create a special forum and a special
procedure. The forum might well be a special committee on innovation
or a special subcommittee of the Council on Legal Education with provi-
sions for adding such other members as appears appropriate depending
upon the nature of the innovation involved.
There should be a separate procedure for seeking and securing desig-
nation as an experimental institution whereby a school seeking to inno-
vate can secure accreditation without first having to comply with all
existing standards or secure waivers of the standards one-by-one. Appli-
cation for such a designation would include a statement of the nature of
and rationale for the experiment, the problem the experiment seeks to
address, and the significance of that problem for the profession or for
the legal system. A submission in the form of a self-study containing
those elements should be considered sufficient to establish a prima facie
basis for referral to the special committee or forum.
After application and referral, it would be appropriate for the special
committee to engage in a process of dialogue which differs from the
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quasi-adjudicative nat ure of accreditation inspections. The accreditation
process can itself be sufficiently onerous, expensive and time-consum-
ing as to effectively discourage innovation. For this reason, I would
recommend that the initial inquiry should be limited to two and only
two general questions. If these questions are answered to the satisfac-
tion of the committee, then provisional accreditation with designation as
an experimental institution should be awarded, coupled with provision
for periodic monitoring conducted in a manner jointly agreeable to the
committee and the applicant institution.
The two lines of inquiry appropriate to foster responsible innovation
could be stated as follows: 1) Is the experimentation being undertaken
in a responsible and rigorous fashion to achieve certain objectives, to
test certain hypothese, to utilize certain methodologies and to produce
certain results? Have those been articulated and thought through with
the rigor one might legitimately demand of any experiment? 2) Because
experimentation in legal education necessarily entails experimentation
on human subjects (faculty, students, staff, client, administrators), have
the safeguards and inquiries associated with experiments on human
beings been incorporated? This involves spelling out the meaning of
informed consent and the allowable range of risk to which persons may
voluntarily subject themselves. In determining the allowable range of
risk, one must weigh several factors. The risk to the subject should be
outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the subject and the importance
of the knowledge to be gained so as to warrant a decision to allow the
subject to accept those risks. The rights and welfare of such subjects
must be adequately protected, and protected to the extent possible con-
sistent with the design of the experiment. Finally, legally effective
informed consent must be obtained by adequate and appropriate
methods.
All of these questions become apropos in such matters as admissions,
student attrition, faculty retention and workload. Even where a totally
innovative curriculum is involved, the school may "hedge" its bet by
incorporating minimal provisions that would enable a student to gain
access to legal knowledge in the conventional fashion should the experi-
ment fail.
At present, the accreditation process actively operates to discourage
innovation. While tolerating "add-ons" once full compliance is achieved
the process regards them as marginal and distinctly subordinate to
maintaining the conventional model with its built-in escalating costs for
"bare minimums." The problem was well-framed by Dean Rogers
Crampton:
The cautious approach to the future is to spread resources
over each of the alternative strategies (for change in legal
education) rather than to commit an institution to a single one.
For a prestige institution, this approach probably involves less
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risk on the downside; but it also involves a reduced likelihood of
really outstanding performance in the years ahead.
Only a few schools have dared either to stick with the tradi-
tional model in its undiluted form or to place an emphasis on one
or another of the three modern trends: Antioch in clinical legal
education and Chicago in legal research are two uncharacteristic
examples that come to mind. Most law schools have followed the
Harvard pattern of maintaining the traditional framework while
pursuing all three modern trends simultaneously. It is doubtful
whether any schools, except perhaps Harvard, have resources
that are sufficient to support adequate programs on all fronts.7"
V. CONCLUSION
However conceptually valid the proposed approach may be, it is
reasonable to ask: "Why all the bother?" Does not the foregoing pro-
posal entail an enormous amount of overkill simply to accommodate the
inclusion of clinical education in the law school curriculum? Why, in-
deed, should the resource "tug of war" over a clinic be regarded as dif-
ferent from those involved in adding a single small seminar that has a
comparable faculty-student ratio?
First, as most of this article has attempted to demonstrate, clinical
education is different to the extent that it involves the creation,
organization, and management of a total educational environment.
Second, and more fundamentally, clinical education, viewed as a subset
of innovation, stands for and embodies numerous different agendas,
each of which traditional legal education has failed to address. Some of
the agendas are historically rooted such as the under-representation of
minorities, the poor, and women in the legal profession. Some of those
agendas address the present state of the profession, including basic
issues of competence, adequate systems for policing professional respon-
sibility, and more cost efficient methods of delivering legal services to
the indigent and the legally indigent (which includes the vast majority
of Americans). Some of these agendas reflect the insertion of legal
realism as a jurisprudential query regarding whether any of our laws
work and in fact whether the legal system itself works. And some of the
agendas are future oriented, addressing emerging delivery systems, in-
creased use of paralegals, and the unknown but towering role that
technology will play in the future.
Law schools now function both atomistically and eclectically, riding
all horses with each professor free to do his or her own thing so long as
each shoulders an equitable share of the large required courses which
generate the critical tuition revenues. If any law school wished to define
itself centrally as committing institutional resources to one distinctive
71 R. Crampton, Annual Report on Cornell Law School (1977) (on file with
author).
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mission, then compliance with equally escalating accreditation stan-
dards would pose a conflict. But the conflict is even greater if one
assumes there is no need for any more law schools in the traditional
mold but an acute need for new law schools that will address themselves
to more distinctive, specialized missions such as one or more of the
agendas enumerated above. At this point, the accreditation standards
operate as a virtual bar, except where such vast monetary resources
can be applied to facilities, faculty, library, etc., that not even the most
inflated interpretation of the standards poses an obstacle.
Yet, the availability of resources on that scale may prove least likely
where legal education seeks to wrestle with the persistent paradoxes of
poverty, inequality, disenfranchisement and injustice. Nor are the prob-
lems of innovation limited to the economically disadvantaged. The study
of the Common Law was forbidden at Cambridge and Oxford where the
glories of Roman Law were celebrated-as Blackstone's writings in
academic exile from the Inns of Court tell us."2 Langdell survived col-
legial hostility by sheer longevity,73 and his disciples spread the gospel
long before it was fully accepted by colleagues at Harvard. As we enter
an age of rapid change, of future shock of the micro-millenium, there is a
critical need to find a way to grant more than a grudging acceptance to
new approaches lest we find that the model for competition among ideas
is not Adam Smith's, but Schumpeter's.
72 See generally W. BLACKSTONE, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LAW: SELECTIONS
FROM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (G. Jones ed. 1973).
" See Tyler and Catz, The Contradictions of Clinical Legal Education, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 693, 695 (1980).
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APPENDIX A
I. ORAL COMPETENCY
General Definition: The ability to assess, control, and vary verbal and
non-verbal communications with an audience(s) in a given situation to
maximize the accomplishment of objectives.
Specific Competencies:
A. Ability to use the mechanics of language (e.g., grammar, syntax,
articulation).
B. Ability to express a thought with preciseness, clarity and economy.
C. Ability to express thoughts in an organized manner.
D. Ability to speak appropriately to a given audience.
E. Ability to identify and use appropriate non-verbal aspects of com-
munications (e.g., appearance, poise, gestures, facial expressions,
posture, and use of special relationships).
F. Ability to perceive others' communications and actions (verbal and
non-verbal).
G. Ability to communicate so as to advance immediate and long-term
objectives.
II. WRITTEN COMPETENCY
General Definition: The ability to control and vary written communica-
tions with an audience(s) in a given situation to maximize the accom-
plishment of objectives.
Specific Competencies:
A . Ability to use the mechanics of the language (e.g., grammar, spell-
ing, punctuation).
B . Ability to express a thought with preciseness, clarity, and economy.
C . Ability to express thoughts in an organized manner.
D. Ability to write appropriately to a given audience (e.g., format,
citation form, vocabulary).
E. Ability to perceive the communications of others (implicit and expli-
cit messages.)
F . Ability to write so as to advance the immediate and long-term ob-
jectives.
N 0 T E : The specific competencies parallel most of those for Oral
Competency, and the notes for them generally apply to
Written Competency as well.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS COMPETENCY
General Definitions: The ability to combine law and facts in a given
situation to generate, justify, and assess the relative merits of alter-
native legal positions.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS: ANALYZING FACTS AND
IDENTIFYING RELEVANT LAW
A. Analyzing Facts and Identifying Relevant Law- Given a fact situa-
tion and knowledge of rules of law, ability to identify relationships
between facts and law in a way that will facilitate the formulation
of alternative legal theories.
Specific Compe tencies:
(Analysis of Facts)
1 . Ability to identify relevant facts.
2. Ability to identify inconsistencies among facts.
3. Ability to identify the reliability to asserted facts.
4. Ability to distinguish facts from conclusions of law.
(Identification of Relevant Law)
5. Ability to determine rules of law relevant to framing legal
issues (e.g., statutes, regulations, case law, court rules, secon-
dary authorities.)
6. Ability to formulate legal rules appropriately or correctly.
7. Ability to determine trends in interpretation or application of
laws.
8. Ability to identify discrete legal issues.
N 0 T E: For the specific competencies in this sub-part of legal
analysis, and in subsequent sub-parts of legal analysis, a
particular sequence or process of steps is not implied. A
model was followed in deriving elements (specific competen-
cies) listed here. Other models should in one form/sequence
or another, involve the same elements. Thus, these ele-
ments should be adaptable to various styles of legal
analysis. Readers will also note that some specific com-
petencies may overlap. This is probably inevitable, although
we do not believe there are complete redundancies. It is
believed that differences in seemingly similar specific com-
petencies will aid in diagnosis of legal analysis problems.
LEGAL ANALYSIS: FORMULATING LEGAL THEORIES
B . Formulating Legal Theories-Given fact analysis, the law, and the
resulting identification of legal issues, the ability to identify and
organize arguments and counter-arguments in terms of claims,
defenses, or other legal results.
Specific Competencies:
1 . Ability to group and categorize facts in terms of the concepts or
language of the law.
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2 . Ability to select aspects of the facts which appear to call for the
application or non-application of a legal rule or concept.
3 . Ability to select aspects of a legal rule or concept which appear
to call for its application or non-application to the facts.
4 . Ability to show why some application of a legal rule or concept
calls for an extension, limitation, or rejection of another rule or
concept.
5. Ability to separate, combine and sequence arguments to for-
mulate a legal theory.
6. Ability to sequence a complete range of legal theories in accor-
dance with some systematic ordering principle.
LEGAL ANALYSIS: EVALUATING LEGAL THEORIES
C. Evaluating Legal Theories-Given a legal theory or alternative
legal theories, the ability to predict the decision of an authoritative
source.
Specific Competencies:
1 . Ability to identify the predisposition of a particular decision-
maker or class of decision-makers (e.g., characteristics of the
decision-maker, workings of the decision-maker's institution,
patterns of previous decisions, reasons given for previous deci-
sions).
2. Ability to identify compelling equities recognized by the law or
inherent in the fact situation.
3 . Ability to determine relative effectiveness of a legal theory or
of alternative legal theories by analysis and evaluation of 1 and
2 (above).
IV. PROBLEM-SOLVING COMPETENCY
General Definition: The ability to use legal analysis and other informa-
tion to identify and diagnose problems in terms of client's objectives
and to generate strategies and tactics to achieve those objectives.
N 0 T E: Problem-solving competencies are cast here in the contest
of the client's objectives and priorities. Most definitions to
follow imply a lawyer-client interaction. Problem-solving
skills, however, are called upon throughout the lawyering
process. Thus, there will be many occasions for evaluating
problem-solving skills independently of client involvement
(e.g., the selection of tactics used in the design of an inter-
rogatory) or the elements involved in the use of a discovery
instrument. It is assumed, in such cases, that the use of such
problem-solving skills is nevertheless derived from know-
ledge of client's objectives and priorities.
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PROBLEM-SOL VING: IDENTIFYING AND
DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS
A. Identifying and Diagnosing Problems- Given a situation, ability to
isolate the problem and to identify, generate, and organize informa-
tion in a way that will facilitate the formulation of alternative solu-
tions.
Specific Competencies:
1 . Ability to identify client's objectives and priorities.
2. Ability to identify obstacles and facilitating factors that bear on
the realization of client objectives and priorities.
3. Ability to state alternative definitions of client's problem(s).
4. Ability to identify and develop information and steps needed to
clarify alternative definitions of the problem(s).
5. Ability to make a tentative choice among alternative definitions
of the problem(s).
PROBLEM-SOL VING: DEVELOPING SOL UTIONS
AND S TRA TEGIES
B. Developing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternative Solutions and
Strategies-Given diagnosis of a problem, the ability to develop
and evaluate alternative courses of action designed to advance
some or all of the client's objectives, and make a justifiable selec-
tion.
Specific Competencies:
1 . Ability to develop alternative solutions and strategies which
include consideration of types of strategy, risk, benefits, legal
and social consequences, client control, forums, economics and
ethics.
2. Ability to assess and order the range of alternative solutions
and strategies with respect to client's objectives and priorities;
probability of success; consequences of success, partial success
or failure; available resources; and ethics.
3. Ability to reach informed consent with client on preferred solu-
tions and stategies when appropriate.
PROBLEM-SOL VING: IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES
C. Implementing Strategies- Given selection of solutions and
strategies, the ability to implement and modify those strategies by
taking actions and evaluating results in light of objectives and
other criteria.
Specific Competencies:
1 . Ability to formulate a work plan that identifies who will do
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what, with whom, where, when, and with what expected results
and costs.
2. Ability to take the actions (or assure that assigned others do) to
carry out the formulated work plan.
3. Ability to check results at anticipated points and unanticipated
times, and adjust as necessary.
4. Ability to seek and use counsel and advice in timely fashion.
V. PROFESIONAL RESPONSIBILITY COMPETENCY
General Definition: The ability to recognize the ethical considerations in
a situation, analyze and evaluate their implications for present and
future actions, and behave in a manner that facilitates timely assertion
of rights.
Specific Competencies:
A. Ability to identify situational conflicts with the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, or with commonly recognized institutional
and professional norms and standards of conduct that flow from
one's role in rendering services to clients.
B . Ability to identify situational conflicts with other ethical,
ideological, or personal considerations bearing on a case or the
lawyer/client relationship.
C. Ability to identify and weigh alternative courses of action in light
of actual or potential situational conflicts in 1 and 2 above.
D. Ability to act consistently with decisions and commitments
resulting from the analysis of actual or potential conflicts.
N 0 T E: This area of competency is analogous to the previously
described legal analysis competencies. It includes the iden-
tification of a particular set of rules, concepts, norms and
similar considerations as these relate to actual situations
with particular characteristics.
VI. PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMPETENCY
General Definition: The ability to manage time, effort, available
resources,and competing priorities in a manner which generates the
maximum output of quality legal services.
Specific Competencies:
A . Ability to allocate time, effort and other resources necessary to
carry out case load tasks.
B . Ability to coordinate efforts with others.
C . Ability to work according to applicable systems, rules and pro-
cedures governing the handling of cases and files.
D. Ability to assess sytem operations and design improvements in the
system, rules, and procedures governing the handling of cases and
files.
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E . Ability to maintain a level t4 produclivity t hal conforms with appli-
cahle standards and normatlive expecl at ions.
F . Ahility to judge the point it which further commitmenls canlot
realist icallv he discharged conlp et ent ly.
G . Ability to supervise others.
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